Some Labor Market Statistics — March 2013

6 Mar

Some Labor Market Statistics March 5, 2102

BLS Mass Layoff Statistics:

http://www.bls.gov/mL

 

Mass layoff events fell from 1,435 in January 2012 to 1,328 in January 2012.   In January 2009, there were 2,256 mass layoff events. This is the lowest January statistic for mass layoff events since January 2007 when mass layoff numbers were at 1,236.

 

Series Id:                       MLSMS00NN0119003 (1)

Unemployment claims attributable to mass layoff events rose from 129,169 in January 2012 to 134,026 in January 2013.  In January 2009, there were 237,182 unemployment claims attributable to mass layoffs.  January 2007, unemployment claimants attributable to mass layoffs were at 129,105, virtually identical to the January 2013 level

Series Id:                       MLSMS00NN0119005 (1)

Job Opening and Labor Turnover Survey:

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/data.htm

Hires:

Job hires as a percent of total employment remained essentially unchanged between December 2011 and December 2012.  The December 2011 number was 3.2%.  The preliminary December 2012 number was 3.1%.  The December 2007 job hire percentage was 3.6%

Series Id:     JTS00000000HIR (2)

Openings:

The job-opening rate remained unchanged December 2011 to 2012 at 2.6%.  This is up from the 1.8% job-opening rate in December 2009 but down from the 3.0% rate in December of 2006.

Separations:

The end-of year job separation rate has hovered at 3.0% since December 2009.  From 2002-2008 the separation rate was in the 3.6% to 3.9% range.  (I find the persistence of a lower separation rate after the recession interesting.    There are several potential causes.  Decreased separation could be the result of delays in retirements, fewer opportunities to move to a better job, or worker’s clinging to their position rather than risk a new opportunity.

Series Id:     JTS00000000TSR (3)

Current Employment Statistics (CES):

http://www.bls.gov/ces/#data

There were 113.0 million private sector workers in January 2013 up from 110.9 million in January 2012 but still below the 115.7 million workers in January 2008.

Series Id:     CES0500000001

Average weekly hours worked by private sector workers was unchanged at 34.4 hours per week between January 2012 and January 2013.  CES estimates of average hours worked are remarkably stable despite the massive economic turmoil.   At January 2010, the average weekly hours worked stood at 34.0.  At January 2008, average hours worked was 34.6.  (Have CES average hours worked estimates always been this stables?  Are CPS estimates for hours worked more useful than CES estimates?

Series Id:     CES0500000002

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Some thoughts on housing and taxes

8 Dec

Some thoughts on housing and taxes

The discussions on the fiscal cliff are currently centered over the desirability of raising tax rates on high-income individuals (President Obama’s position) versus tax reform that broaden the tax base (Speaker Boehner’s position.)   The House Republicans have not been specific about what type of tax reform they want to adopt.  Most proposals involve either limiting total deductions or eliminating or modifying the mortgage tax deduction.  Many housing groups are lobbying hard to maintain the current preferential status of the mortgage deduction.  Even among economists who favor reducing the tax preferences given to home owners, there is a wide divergence of views over what plans should be adopted.

This post discusses recent proposals to eliminate or modify the deduction on mortgage interest and their potential implications for the housing market and fiscal policy.

Most of the housing-related tax reform proposals involve either the elimination or modification of the tax deduction on mortgage interest.  Current law allows for the deduction of interest on 1.1 million dollars of mortgage debt (2013.)  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in their budget option paper studied the possibility of gradually phasing out the mortgage interest deduction between 2013 and 2024.

http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12085/03-10-reducingthedeficit.pdf

The Tax Policy Center (TPC) considered several proposals to limit (but not eliminate) the mortgage deductions and to replace the mortgage tax deduction with an itemized credit equal to 15% of mortgage interest.

http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?ID=412496

There are major substantive differences between the elimination option described in the CBO paper and the modification options described in the TPC paper.  Elimination of the mortgage deduction affects all homeowners with a mortgage regardless of income.  The modification of the mortgage deduction by creating a $500,000 cap and by replacing the deduction with a 15% credit for taxpayers in all income results in the largest increase in tax obligations for higher-income taxpayers.  Moreover, the switch to a tax credit would result in reduced tax obligations for households with mortgages that do not itemize their taxes.

In a recent study, Anthony Randazzo and Dean Stansel of the Reason Foundation find that the mortgage income deduction favors the rich.

http://reason.org/files/midsummary_final.pdf

Randazzo and Stansel wrote:

“The mortgage interest deduction is almost exclusively claimed by households in the top income brackets and younger individuals who have not paid off their loans.

Interestingly, the data in their report does not support this conclusion.  Table two of their paper reveals that less than 10% of individuals receiving the mortgage income deduction have income over $200,000 per year.  Over 40% of mortgage income deduction claims are by households with income between $50,000 and $100,000.  Many more middle-income people claim the mortgage interest deduction than receive the preferential tax rate on capital gains.

Randazzo and Stansel do show that the average mortgage deduction does increase substantially with income.  The TPC options of capping mortgage interest deductions and replacing the deduction with a credit would reduce the mortgage interest deduction received by the rich and maintain the deduction for middle-income households.

It is likely that any modification of the mortgage deduction would have to be gradual rather than sudden because a large sudden change in the deduction would result in sudden large increases in tax obligations for some households.  A gradual phase-in of the new tax regime would allow time for taxpayers to restructure their obligations and pay off at least some of their mortgage.

A gradual phase out of the mortgage interest deduction provides very little additional tax revenue in the near term.  The CBO found that the gradual phase out resulted in only $14 billion in additional revenue between 2012 and 2016 and by $215 billion through 2012.

The Tax Policy Center considered both five-year and ten-year phase-in scenarios.  Gradual phase-in scenarios also reduced revenue receipts over the near term for the TPC options.

A sudden change in rules governing mortgage tax deductions could substantially weaken the financial balance sheet of households with large mortgages.  However, a gradual change in rules governing mortgage interest deductions does not provide much new tax revenue and does little to impact fiscal imbalances over the next decade.

In the long term, tax reforms that modify the mortgage interest deduction can provide additional tax revenue.  In the short term, fiscal balance could be more effectively and fairly restored by increasing marginal tax rates for higher-income individuals.

The mortgage tax deduction is not the only tax preference accorded to housing that could be considered as part of a tax reform proposal.  Under current rules, the first $250,000 of a capital gain on an owner-occupied home is not subject to capital gains taxes.   This tax provides an incentive (especially in boom markets) for some individuals to purchase a home even if there is a likelihood that they will need to relocate.  This tax preference also favors the purchase of owner-occupied real estate over investments in financial assets and 401(K) plans that might entail less financial risk.

Current law also allows homeowners to deduct interest on $100,000 home equity loans.  Some tax savings might be achieved by eliminating the deductibility of interest on home equity loans.

A final reason for going relatively slowly on tax reforms affecting housing and mortgages is that the housing market is still relatively weak.  Statistics released by the Mortgage Bankers Association reveal that at the end of 2012 11.7% of mortgages were either late one month or in foreclosure and that over 7% of loans remained seriously delinquent.

http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/82552.htm

Concluding thoughts:  There are several bottom lines on this post.   Total elimination of the mortgage tax deduction would affect a lot of middle-income people.  Placing a cap on the mortgage deduction and substituting a credit for a deduction primarily affects wealthy households.  Any change in the mortgage tax deduction would have to be phased in gradually.  A phased-in modification of the mortgage tax deduction has little impact on fiscal imbalances over the next decade.

 

 

 

Is IBR the best way to provide student loan debt relief?

21 Nov

The Income Based Replacement (IBR) Loan Program is a new program strongly supported by the Obama Administration, designed to provide debt relief to overextended student borrowers.  This post considers the advantages and disadvantages of the IBR program.

Description of IBR program:  The primary objective of the IBR program is to help student borrowers avoid defaulting on their loans when their household income is low.  This is accomplished by linking student debt to household income.

Under the IBR program, the required student loan payment is $0 when household income is less than 150% of the federal poverty line.  When household income is more than 150% of the federal poverty line, the IBR payment is the minimum of 15% of disposable income or the standard payment on a 10 year-student loan. (Disposable income is defined as household income minus 150% of the federal poverty line.)  Individuals with family income exceeding 15% of disposable income will make the standard payment for a 10-year loan.

Other important features of the IBR program include:

  • government payments of monthly interest for up to three consecutive years if the IBR payment does not cover monthly interest under the 10-year repayment plan,

 

  • no capitalization of interest when income is less than 15% of disposable income,

 

  • remaining balance on the loan is forgiven after twenty five years,

 

  • facilitates eligibility for public loan forgiveness for student borrowers employed by public service organizations.

 

IBR Issues:

Will many student borrowers take advantage of the IBR program?

The take-up rate for the IBR program is low and is likely to remain low for several reasons.

  • Private student loans, PLUS loans made to parents and any consolidated loan with a PLUS loan made to parents or a private loan are not eligible for IBR.  Students who are not aware of the rules of the program when they are taking out or consolidating their loans will not be able to take full advantage of the IBR program.
  • Many student loan borrowers are likely to prefer a 20-year fixed rate loan over a 10-year loan that is eligible for reduced IBR payments.  The IBR loan payment increases with income and reverts to the standard payment on a 10-year loan once household income rises above 15% of household income. The standard payment based on the 10-year amortization schedule may be unaffordable if the household has other debts.  A student borrower who chooses IBR over a 20-year loan may be forced to consolidate into a 20-year loan with a higher payment than what he would have been charged if he chose the 20-year fixed option when beginning repayment.  A recent report by the New America Foundation has an interesting discussion of this issue.
  • In many instances, married households must file separate returns in order to obtain full (in some cases any) advantage of the IBR program.  The decision to file separate returns generally increases a household’s tax obligation.   Separate returns can lead to higher marginal tax rates for the spouse with the higher income and loss of considerable tax deductions.   Ideally this issue should be considered by student borrowers when they are considering different payment options.  However, at that point in time most student borrowers are single and not thinking of potential future tax obligations when married.

Will student borrowers who take advantage of IBR receive a large government subsidy?

Student borrowers who pay the reduced IBR monthly payment rather than the 10-year scheduled payment will have their loan extended past ten years. As a result, many borrowers who take advantage of the IBR program in order to receive lower monthly payments will end up paying more on their student loan than they would have if they had maintained their scheduled payment under a 10-year payment plan.  Also, as noted above many married student borrowers who take advantage of the IBR program will pay more in federal income tax over their lifetime.

Debt forgiveness after 25 years will only occur when a student borrower has chronically high levels of debt in relation to disposable income.

Should the IBR loan program be made more generous?

The Obama Administration proposes to make the IBR program more generous by reducing the lBR payment to 10% of disposable income (from the current level of 15% of disposable income) and by allowing for loan forgiveness after 20 years rather than after 25 years.   A recent study by the New America Foundation found that these changes benefit mostly higher-income borrowers.  However, the NAF analysis is not definitive.

Some quick comments on the NAF report:

The NAF foundation report contains case studies that examine how different types of borrowers fare under the old IBR program, the IBR program proposed by the Obama Administration, and standard 10-year or 20-year loans.  One of the borrowers evaluated in this report is Robert an affluent lawyer.  Under the newly proposed IBR program Robert would have $160,536 of debt forgiven after working 20 years even though he had a $164,000 annual salary.  The NAF report does not state whether Robert’s example or any of the other examples considered in the report are typical or atypical.  A more informative analysis would consider typical income paths and debt levels for particular professions.  Lawyers are not a beloved profession and choosing Robert to be a lawyer rather than say a cancer researcher or an osteopath definitely sets the reader’s mood.

The NAF study is not definitive.  However, other ways to provide debt relief to student borrowers including modifications to the bankruptcy code are likely to be more effective at providing relief to debtors in financial distress than would enhancements to IBR.

Does the IBR program encourage individuals to borrow more? 

Under the current IBR payment formula, the actual amount a student borrower must repay if his debt level is more than 15% of disposable income is independent of the amount the student borrowed.  Under these circumstances, the required payment is 15% of income, regardless of how much the student debtor borrowed.

Despite the possibility of free money the number of students who increase their debt levels because of the IBR program is likely to be fairly low.

  • Many student borrowers, especially students at private undergraduate schools, borrow the maximum allowable amount of public loans and even rely on private loans and PLUS loans to parents.
  • Most student borrowers do not know their future earnings, marital status, and family size factors that impact their IBR benefits.

The incentive for IBR to increase the amount students choose to borrow could be largely eliminated by modifying the loan forgiveness feature of the current IBR formula.  The current loan forgiveness formula forgives the loan balance, which remains after 25 years.  An alternative loan forgiveness formula setting the interest rate on the remaining loan balance to 0% after 20 years rather than totally forgiving the outstanding balance would keep repayment obligations positively related to initial debt levels.

How might IBR be modified to allow for additional loan relief to individuals who are insolvent and are likely to remain insolvent for a long period of time?  

Under current bankruptcy law, it is extremely difficult for student borrowers to have any student debt discharged.  The IBR program does not fully address the needs of highly distressed student borrowers.  It may be desirable to allow student borrowers in extreme financial distress to petition the bankruptcy court to speed up debt forgiveness.

Concluding thoughts:

The IBR program is likely to have a modest impact on financial problems induced by excessive student debt.  Moreover; the IBR program is likely to impose only a modest cost on taxpayers.

  • The take-up rate for the program is likely to be low for a wide variety of reasons.
  • Most student borrowers are likely to be better off over the long term in a fixed 20-year consolidated loan than in a 10-year loan that is IBR eligible.
  • Many (perhaps most) student borrowers who enroll in IBR will pay more on their student loan over the life time of their loan and will receive little or no loan forgiveness.
  • Many (perhaps most) married individuals who enroll in IBR will pay more in taxes if they are to fully take advantage of the IBR program.

Additional readings on IBR:

New America Foundation Report on IBR

http://newamerica.net/pressroom/2012/release_student_loan_expert_exposes_flaws_in_obamas_pay_as_you_earn_plan

OPED: Seven ways to provide student loan debt relief

http://www.nasfaa.org/advocacy/perspectives/articles/Seven_Ways_to_Provide_Student_Loan_Debt_Relief.aspx

Student loan forgiveness (Kindle version)

http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url=search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=sutdent+debt+david+bernstein+

Student Loan Forgiveness (Nook Version)

http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/student-loan-forgiveness-david-bernstein/1113728860?ean=2940015901580

 

Should you purchase long term care insurance?

14 Nov

The following appeared in Dave Ramsey’s column on Fox News.

Dear Dave,

I just turned 57 and have been researching long-term care policies. Is there a point where you can self-insure for long-term care needs without a policy?

-Peter

Dear Peter,

Mathematically, I’d say you could safely self-insure if you have the resources available to support your care in a nursing home or other facility for 25 years. Of course, if you’re married you have to think about your spouse and make sure she has enough to live on comfortably at the same time. That’s a lot of money. In my mind, it’s a large enough bill that it makes sense to transfer the risk to a long-term care insurance policy.

The simple truth is most people won’t have enough money to self-insure for that kind of thing when the time comes. If you have $20 million liquid sitting around, then you could easily set aside $2 to $3 million for long-term care and still be in great shape. But I advise virtually everyone to have good, long-term care coverage in place by age 60. For many folks, it can make the difference between living with dignity and having to depend on the government. And that’s not something I ever want to do for anything—especially not my healthcare!

-Dave

Read more: http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2012/11/20/do-really-need-long-term-care-insurance/#ixzz2CDmAHG27

Dave Ramsey has done some interesting work.  See his web site www.daveramsey.com

Respectfully, I disagree with Mr. Ramsey’s analysis on the issue of whether people should purchase long term care insurance.  Only around 50% of households are on target to have adequate savings in retirement.  Mr. Ramsey believes that only people with twenty to thirty million sitting around should self-insure because they are the only ones who “can set aside two to three million for long term care and still be in great shape”  In reality, the extreme rich are the only ones who can afford multi-year or life-time long term care insurance.  Also, it may make sense for a person with a lot of non-liquid assets to purchase multi-year insurance.

Individuals who spend all their assets are likely to qualify for the Medicaid benefit.  Some individuals deliberately spend down their assets to qualify for the Medicaid benefit.  I am troubled by this technique.

Some middle and upper middle income individuals should consider purchasing one or two years of long term care insurance coverage.  However, this purchase should only be made if they have been fully funding their 401(k) plan, have enough liquid assets to pay off their mortgage, and do not have credit card debt or other consumer loans.

Ironically, most people who purchase one or two years of long term care coverage must rely on the government to pay expenses if they stay in a nursing home for a long period of time.

I have written on this topic.  The interested reader should examine my manuscript “Things to Consider before Purchasing Long Term Care Insurance” on Kindle or Nook.

 

Kindle edition:

http://www.amazon.com/consider-purchasing-insurance-Economic-ebook/dp/B008N5QO8G

 

Nook edition:

http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/things-to-consider-before-purchasing-long-term-care-insurance-david-bernstein/1113578815

Taxes and the Affordable Care Act

13 Nov

At the time of the writing of this post, the nation is moving from preoccupation about an election to concerns about taxes, spending, and the fiscal cliff.   To many, the debate over the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is a distant memory.  However, the ACA has not yet been fully implemented, regulators and the Administration have substantial latitude over details of the new law, and some provisions may be revisited by Congress.

Some aspects of ACA are tax related and are intertwined with discussions over the fiscal cliff and tax reform proposals.  One of these provisions involves a tax credit for the purchase of health insurance on state exchanges by households who have income less than 400% FPL and do not have access to employer sponsored insurance.

Households claim the tax credit at the beginning of the year when they do not yet know their annual income or whether they are even eligible for the tax credit.  The ACA tax credit is sent directly from the Treasury to the firm providing health insurance to the household.  Taxpayers who underestimate their income (overestimate the amount of the tax credit that they are eligible for) must repay part, or in some cases, the entire overpayment when filing their taxes.

A major objective of the ACA is to prevent individuals who lack health insurance from going into debt when they became ill or injured and incurred major health related expenditures.  However, overpayments in the ACA tax credit will cause some households to incur debt related to their purchase of insurance on state exchanges.

This post outlines the scope of this problem.

Issue One:  How many individuals and households are likely to obtain their health insurance through state exchanges? 

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that by 2020 twenty million households in the United States will receive premium tax credits with an average credit of $6,740.  There are some reasons to believe that the CBO is understating the eventual role of state exchanges.   Most recipients of insurance from state exchanges will be employees at firms with fewer than 50 employees, which are not subject to the employer mandate.  The number of small firms offering ESI was falling prior to the adoption of the ACA.  ESI coverage at small firms tends to decline even further during recessions when many employees are forced to work part time.

The ACA stipulates that employees at firms that offer ESI are not allowed to take the tax credit for the purchase of health insurance on state exchanges.   Since a firm’s employees lose access to the ACA tax credit if the firm offers ESI coverage and small firms are not mandated to offer coverage many small firms should eschew offering ESI coverage.

Issue Two: How large are the potential repayment obligations for households that receive an overpayment of their ACA tax credit?

There is no limit on repayment obligations for households that end up earning more than 400% FPL during the year.  There are limits on repayment obligations for households that earn less than 400% FPL during the year.

When the ACA was initially enacted the maximum repayment obligation for households with income less than 400% FPL was $400 for individual plans and $600 for family plans.

The repayment obligations were subsequently increased by Congress in order to find funds to increase Medicare reimbursement rates for physicians.  The new repayment obligation limits for individual plans are $300 (FPL < 200 percent), $750 (FPL between 200 percent and 299 percent) and $1,250 (FPL between 300 percent and 399 percent.)  The repayment limits are doubled for family plans.  Pending legislation in the House of Representatives may eliminate or reduce limitations on repayment obligations for individuals with household income less than 400% FPL.

A household with anticipated income slightly below the 400% FPL level who works additional hours and realizes income slightly above the 400% FPL level will lose the entire tax credit.  A household that anticipated income slightly less than 400% FPL but realized income slightly more than 400% FPL could very easily end up owing the Treasury thousands of dollars.  Unanticipated debts of this magnitude could cause some household to declare personal bankruptcy.

Issue Three:  Will a large number of households incorrectly estimate their income and owe funds to the IRS because of the ACA tax credit?

There are many reasons why households might incorrectly estimate their income.  First, many workers get paid by the hour and do not have a set number of hours per week.  Second, many workers are employed seasonally and do not know the number of weeks per year they will be employed.  Third, workers who are laid off will have an increase in household income when they are reemployed.  Fourth, workers will realize changes in earnings when firms cut or expand hours due to fluctuations in the business cycle.  (The fluctuations in hours will include mandatory overtime.)  Fifth, household earnings are affected by the entry or exit of second earners from the workforce.

Academic research by Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel found that the volatility of household income has increased by one-third between the 1970s and the early 2000s.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1051141

Two countries, Australia and the United Kingdom have implemented paid-in-advance tax credits that are similar to the ACA tax credit that will be implemented in the United Kingdom.   Recipients of the tax credits in these other countries have been forced to repay part of the tax credit they received.

Australia:  An end-of-year reconciliation system was first implemented in Australia for the tax year extending from July 1, 2000 to June 31, 2001.  The reconciliation immediately became a major political issue.  Prior to an election the government announced that the first $1,000 of overpayment obligations would be waived.  After the implementation of the reconciliation requirement one-third of all households were overpaid and had an end of year debt.  (This statistic was obtained in a paper by Whiteford, P. Mendelson, M. and Jane Millar, “Timing it right? Tax Credits and how to respond to income changes,” Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2003.)

In 2004, Australia introduced a second lump-sum tax credit that was paid at the end of the year.  The end-of-year tax credit became collateral for overpayments on the advanced-year tax credit.  As a result of the new tax credit, the proportion of families that owed money at the end of year fell from around 32% in 2002-2003 to around 8% in 2007-2008.  Australia solved the problem associated with overpayment of advanced-paid tax credits by adding an additional fairly generous end-of-year lump-sum tax credit.

United Kingdom:  The working-class tax credit was first introduced in the United Kingdom in April 2003-2004. Household debts induced by overpayments of the tax credit immediately became an economic problem.   There has been some reduction in overpayments in tax credits due to efforts by the U.K. tax authorities.

  • In 2009/2010 1.453 million households (20% of all recipients) were overpaid the working-class tax credit.  The average overpayment was 847 pounds.

http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtc-final-awards-supp-may11.pdf

Small overpayments are manageable for most households.  A potentially more important issue involves the number of large overpayments resulting in a large household debt burden.

  • Around 13% of all overpayments involved an overpayment exceeding 200 pounds.

http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtc-final-awards-supp-may11.pdf

Debts incurred from overpaid tax credits remain a strong political issue in the U.K.   See the protest site link below as evidenced in http://www.taxcc.org/index.html

Issue Four:  What are the financial impacts of the overpayment of the ACA tax credit on households?

Many households have low levels of liquid assets.    Federal Reserve Board economists estimated that in 2007 median liquid assets defined as the sum of checking and savings accounts was around $4,100.

http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2009/pdf/scf09.pdf

For households with limited liquid assets, the overpayment of the ACA tax credit can result in a non-trivial bill.  Empirical research has shown that many individuals who declare bankruptcy have relatively few debts.  The combination of low household liquidity and a new health insurance related debt could result in the ACA causing some individuals to file for personal bankruptcy.

Issue Five:  What might the IRS do to minimize impacts of ACA overpayments?

There are some ways to minimize financial disruptions caused by overpayments of the ACA tax credit.  One approach might involve reducing the number of overpayments.  Potential policies include:

  • ACA tax credit payments could be based on a conservative estimate of income.  However, this poses difficulties for many households with limited liquidity.
  • ACA tax credit payments might be adjusted quickly when income rises or falls.  However, income changes can be very sudden and the adjustment process is difficult when household income is volatile.  Also, tax credit payment adjustments would not be effective for households with estimated income slightly less than 400% FPL who realize actual income greater than 400% FPL because such households will lose their entire tax credit.

Second, the IRS and state exchanges could take steps to limit financial impact on households that overpay.  Potential policies include:

  • The IRS could waive penalties and interest on financial obligations incurred from overpaid tax credits.
  • The IRS could allow households to substitute towards a less expensive health insurance plan rather than implementing a collection effort.

Currently, the IRS is primarily, perhaps even exclusively, concerned with minimizing volatility to tax receipts.  However, the economic consequences of an unanticipated tax bill on households may be a more costly financial problem to society than the loss of tax revenue to the Treasury.

Issue Six:  How might the Congress fix issues related to the overpayment of the ACA tax credit

Congress could take actions to minimize financial disruptions caused by the overpayment of the ACA tax credit.

  • First, Congress can eliminate or reduce the limits on repayment obligations.  However, Congress appears to be moving in the opposite direction.  The limits set when the ACA was passed have already been increased as part during subsequent budget negotiations.  Congressional Republicans want all ACA limits increased.
  • Second, Congress could modify the ACA tax credit so that small changes in income do not lead to large overpayments.  This change would likely involve an overhaul of the personal income tax.  It is the subject of a future post.
  • Third, Congress could allow individuals who are married but file separate returns to claim the ACA tax credit.  This arcane issue is the subject of a future post.

Concluding thoughts:  Many economists and many Democratic and Republican politicians have supported the provision of health insurance through state insurance exchanges.  The ACA tax credit for the purchase of health insurance on state exchanges by individuals with household income under 400% of FPL and without access to ESI coverage will cause some household to take on substantial personal debt.  A relatively small amount of unanticipated personal debt can result in personal bankruptcy.  The Administration and Congress should place a high priority on fixing this problem.

Review of “Capital Offense” by Michael Hirsh

13 Nov

Capital Offense: How Washington’s Wise Men Turned America’s Future Over to Wall Street, by Michael Hirsh.

Most people view politics as a conflict between democrats and republicans. Similarly, economics is viewed as a debate between those who favor free markets and low taxes versus those who believe that government should play a role in mitigating market imperfections and helping create a fairer and more just society. Michael Hirsh’s portrayals of Washington’s wise men suggest these stereotypes are often not apt. One of these examples, presented in the first chapter, involves the treatment of Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Her attempt to reign in financial abuse was squashed by two Democrats, Robert Rubin and Larry Summers.

The book has a lot of informative portrayals of policymakers, thinkers and the events they shaped.  These include: Milton Friedman and his impact on the futures and options markets, the conflicts between Larry Summers and Joseph Stiglitz, the influence of Ayn Rand on Alan Greenspan, and Paul O’Neil’s opposition to the Bush tax cuts during his short tenure at Treasury.  There are differences among policy makers, with some being highly ideological and others being pragmatic.  However, the book also suggests that corporate interests dominate both political parties.

Capital Offense is well written, informative and a pleasure to read

Review of “Saving the Sun” by Gillian Tett

11 Nov

Saving the Sun is the story of the rise and fall  of Long Term Capital Bank (LTCB).  LTCB created in 1952 became the 9th largest bank in the world in the early 1990s before collapsing under the weight of bad loans and being taken over by American investors.   It is a story of excess, greed, and denial similar to the experiences of American financial firm like Bear Stearns as chronicled in William Cohan’s book “The House of Cards” and by Kate Kelly’s book “Street Fighters.”

There are of course difference between the regulatory environment, the cultures and the business practices in Japan and the United States.  LTCB was taken over by American investors leading to culture clash. The westerners wanted to call loans and make cuts and turn the business around. The Japanese were reluctant to cut long term relationships with their customers, even the insolvent ones.  The conflict between the two approaches took a substantial toll on the Japanese executives who managed LTCB. Tett does a very good job in describing  the tension bwtween the two systems and its toll on participants.

One question addressed but not fully answered in this book is how different are Japan and the United States.  Many American experts wanted Japanese banks to quickly and fully reveal the extent of their losses and to write off bad loans. However, when the financial crisis in the United States occurred, American policy makers implemented TARP.  In both countries, banks with tight connections to the government were  not allowed to fail.  Bankers in response to the financial crisis argued against accounting rules that marked assets to market prices in order to, at least temporarily, hide the true extent of losses.  Shelia Bair in her new  book “Bull by the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and Wall  Street from Itself”maintains that Citibank was saved because of its close connections to the government.  Interestingly, the last President of LTCB, Katsunobi Onogi, was convicted.  This did not happen to  top American financial executives in the more recent financial crisis.

If you are fascinated by Lehman, Bear Stearns, and AIG you will also be fascinated by Long Term Capital Bank.    The book is well written, not incredibly long, and well worth your time.

Finance Memos

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Questioning Conventional Economic Wisdom

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Questioning Conventional Economic Wisdom

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Questioning Conventional Economic Wisdom

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